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Abstract—Complex event processing (CEP) technology is a 
study focus in the data flow processing area, while privacy 
security protection is the key problem that needs to be solved. 
In order to prevent illegal users from acquiring any 
information via registered event patterns, this paper discusses 
the CEP privacy security access control object in depth, 
formally defines four types of event attribute operators 
including completely read, partially read, access denied and 
quantity statistics, presents a privacy security protection 
engine with the event attribute detecting tree as the operating 
mechanism and puts forward a new feasible CEP privacy 
security access control framework based on this. The 
experimental result shows that such framework is able to 
realize efficient privacy information filtration based on the 
user role to reach the goal of CEP detecting information 
processing in a safe manner.  
Keywords-Complex Event Processing; Privacy Security 
Access Control; Event Attribute Detecting Tree; Event Attribute 
Operator; Security Protection Engine 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Data flow processing is a very important and active area 
in modern database technology. CEP technology[1] has 
become the study focus of such field since its inception as it 
is capable of integrating the information from the numerous 
data source distributed and digging the valuable dynamic 
meaning among the information from the high-speed data 
flow in real time. CEP technology is thoroughly changing 
the way of subscription & distribution and application data 
of the traditional information system. It acts as the hub of 
information fusion and dispersion by uncoupling the 
information provider and recipient and playing the roles 
including information observer, analyst and decision maker. 
As the Internet of Things sensor and the network based new 
application quantity surge, the information capacity to be 
processed sees an explosive growth trend. Thus, CEP 
technology is increasingly becoming an essential tool in 
many application fields. However, for most CEP engines at 
present, the processes and content of the complex event 
processing and output are open. That is to say, not only legal 
advanced application can utilize the CEP engine to obtain 
valuable information, but also illegal users are also able to 
acquire any necessary information for their criminal 
behaviors. This presents the CEP technology with huge 
responsibility with respect to the privacy security protection 
in detecting information. 
Up to now, there are few studies on CEP privacy security 
access control, thus the research result in such aspect is just 
in the initial stage. In order to hold back over-class 
information access, literature [2] conducts security access 
expansion for the CEP detection and event model, which 
effectively prevents the unauthorized information from 
being leaked or tampered to the outside. It first increases two 
attribute fields, i.e. "security level" and "current stage", 
behind the traditional event model, and then adds security 
level checker in the query matching tree. The checker allows 
the event the security level of which is lower than the level 
set by this query matching tree to inflow so as to realize 
access control of the information at different security levels. 
Literature[3, 4]designs a set of novel security access 
operators and comes up with a re-query method based on 
such operator set with the relation algebra and query graph 
model of Aurora as well as the view idea of the traditional 
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database management system. Through this method, the 
security access operators are able to be inserted to the 
Aurora query graph model in the most effective way. As a 
result, CEP can perform security access control on the data 
flow in pursuant to the predefined security strategy file. The 
above studies share the same thought, i.e. rewrite the query 
of the CEP event pattern, adjust the original performing 
structure, and insert specialized security detecting unit to 
form an operation structure combining security and the 
original detection pattern. Such kind of method is complex 
and has some deficiencies. 1. Users have different security 
strategies, thus it is necessary to save all relevant user 
security strategies in the security detection unit when 
performing multiple user security strategies in one CEP 
query, which obviously will cause logical mess in the course 
of performance. 2. The newly added security detection unit 
will produce more work load in the process of CEP detection 
and influences its execution efficiency, meanwhile the 
mixed operation structure will be hard to be optimized (e.g. 
share intermediate result). In order to avoid the above 
problems, this article will put forward an efficient CEP 
privacy security access control framework that is feasible 
and easy to be integrated. 
II. CEP PRIVACY SECURITY ACCESS CONTROL OBJECT 
The basic unit of CEP processing work is event. Thus, 
the content of its privacy security access control is the 
information included in the event. According to the event 
model definition provided by the author in the early stage of 
the study (Event_Model:= Event_Type ＠
(Attribute_Name[Data_Type]n) n≥1;), event is a tuple 
composed of N attributes (A1,…,An) and attribute field is 
the minimum unit saved by the information value. Therefore, 
this paper determines event attribute as the object of CEP 
privacy security access control and explain its concept in the 
form of definition. 
Definition 1 Event Attribute It specifies that each event 
flow Stri input into the CEP engine contains one type and 
can only contain one type of event ETj. Certain event type 
ETj is made of N attributes Pk k≥1. P(Stri) represents the set 
of all attributes included in certain event flow Stri and P(ETj) 
represents the set of all attributes included in certain event 
type ETj, then P(Stri)=P(ETj) if ETj∈Stri. In addition, in 
this paper, Stri.pk (or ETj.pk) represents certain attribute in 
certain event flow (or certain event type). 
The user's access right to the event attribute 
(ETj.pk|Stri.pk) content meets four cases: Completely read, 
partially read, access denied and quantity statistics. 
Therefore, a formalized description of such four types of 
access control operator is firstly given.  
Completely read operator ξ: ξ(P(ETi))|ξ(P(Stri)) 
represents complete access control right to the event 
attribute information in the event type (or event flow). It can 
be abbreviated as ξ(ETi)|ξ(Stri). ξ can be used for some 
attributes set of the event type (or event flow), 
ξ(ETi[p1,p2,…]) p1,p2,…∈P(ETi) means only the 
information content of some attributes (p1,p2,…) in the 
event type is allowed to be accessed. 
Partially read operator ф: ф(Expr)(ETi)|ф(Expr)(Stri) 
means the event attribute information in the event type (or 
event flow) can be accessed as per the definition of the 
conditional expression set Expr. The expression expri in 
Expr expression set only exists as conjunction relationship, 
e.g. ETi.location=“L1”∧ ETi. temperature>30, means the 
location attribute of such event is L1, and the temperature 
value attribute is greater than 30. 
Access denied operator ψ: ψ(P(ETi))|ψ(P(Stri)) 
represents complete denial of the access to the event 
attribute information in the event type (or event flow). It can 
be abbreviated as ψ(ETi)|ψ(Stri). Likewise, operator ψ can 
also only deny the access to some attributes, 
ψ(ETi[p1,p2,…]) p1,p2,…∈P(ETi) means only the 
information content of some attributes (p1,p2,…) in the 
event type is denied to be accessed. 
Quantity statistics operator Ω: This access operator 
corresponds to aggregate operations that do not care the 
specific value of the event attribute but concern the total 
number, mean value and other statistics information of the 
event. Ω(F(Pk))(ETi)|Ω(F(Pk))(Stri) means it has statistical 
right to the event attribute Pk in the event type (or event 
flow), of which, F is calculation function, including min, 
max, count, avg and sum, etc. 
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In pursuant to the above formalized description of the 
control operators of security access to event attribute (record 
all operators set Э), the content to which the user may have 
privacy security access for the CEP input event flow should 
substantially be the result of Э operation on the input event 
flow by such user. That is to say, only the information in line 
with the given user security strategy is filtrated. Based on 
this, this article defines CEP privacy security access control 
object as follows. 
Definition 2 Privacy Security Access Control 
Object The privacy security access control object in CEP 
engine is, of which, Strs is the input event flow set of the 
CEP engine, Э is the set of the security access control 
operators of event attribute, and Pi is the event attribute set 
in the event flow. 
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Figure 1. Privacy security access control model 
As shown from the above definition, when allocating 
security access control right to a user, the system 
administrator needs to explicitly designate the privacy 
security protection object to which such user can access for 
such user, i.e. designate the access right to each event 
attribute content for such user. This will bring huge work 
load for the system administrator. In order to operate 
flexibly and conveniently as well as reduce the work load on 
right allocation, this paper divides the security access control 
right of users based on the RBAC model and hierarchy role 
thought. As shown in Fig.1, hierarchy role applies tree 
structure. High level role may include several predecessor 
roles and will automatically inherit the security access rights 
of all predecessor roles to event attribute. Similarly, a user 
instance may have one or more role identities so as to realize 
flexible role allocation. 
III. CEP PRIVACY SECURITY ACCESS CONTROL FRAME 
According to the above privacy security access control 
object, this paper presents CEP security access control 
framework (CEP-SACF) as shown in Fig.2. CEP-SACF is 
easy to be realized without changing the original CEP 
implementation structure.  
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Figure 2. CEP privacy security access control framework 
International Journal of Advanced Network, Monitoring and Controls          Volume 03, No.03, 2018 
80 
CEP-SACF operation includes three stages, i.e. user role 
authorization, pattern registration and privacy security 
access control. First of all, at the user role authorization 
stage, senior system administrator defines the privacy 
security access control object, designates corresponding 
security access operation to the event attribute requiring 
privacy protection and allocates it to the designated user role 
(user role is planned by level,[5, 6]to reduce authorization 
work load); then, the user logs in with the role allocated and 
enters CEP engine management interface where user may 
define its own business rule with CEP event pattern 
language[7], CEP manages GUI and will correlate the 
security rules related to such user role in the privacy security 
access control object strategy file to detect the legality of the 
event pattern to be registered. If there is no conflict of 
security rules, then such event pattern will be registered in 
the independent implementation space of such user role (at 
the time of the first registration, an independent operation 
space should be firstly created for such user role, and the 
event pattern hereafter will be registered under the 
namespace with the same name as the registered user role). 
If the event attribute content requested by the event pattern 
to be accessed is in conflict with the privacy security rules of 
this role, then a prompt of limited user right will show and 
registration of such event pattern will be denied; finally, the 
independent privacy security protection engine will operate 
between the input event flow and CEP engine. Each PSPE 
just saves the privacy security rules related to such user role 
and will make operations of permission (completely read 
operator ξ), rejection (access denied operator ψ), filtration 
(partially read operator ф) or modification (quantity statistics 
operator Ω) for the event attribute in accordance with the 
definition of privacy security access operator of event 
attribute Э. The event processed by operator Ω will be 
repacked. For example, certain event contains (ID, 
TimeStamp, Location) attribute previously and such event 
only permits calculate the total number (perform Ω 
operation for its ID attribute). Other attributes are private 
information that is not permitted to be accessed. Then under 
the function of operator Ω, PSPE will allow all such events 
to pass with the private information contained flowing 
through the event removed. A new event only containing ID 
attribute will be generated. Then it will be sent to the 
corresponding operation space. Furthermore, in order to 
ensure security of CEP output result, PSPE will also receive 
the output in the operation space protected by it and send the 
result to the user within the user role of such space. 
To ensure that under the registered event pattern, the user 
will not acquire the privacy security access right designated 
to such user role beyond the senior administrator and 
guarantee the efficiency of legal detection, this article verify 
the event pattern registered by the user with the following 
algorithm. 
Algorithm 1 Validity Verification Algorithm of CEP Privacy Security Access Control in Event Pattern 
Input: The event pattern declared by the user and user role; 
Output: The event attribute array NProps[] without legal access right in the event pattern definition; 
1. if (find Prop.aggregation(*) in Event_pattern)==true 
    Props<String,String>.put(EventType,aggregation_operator_name); 
2. Iterator (expression in where clause ) { 
    EventType=get_EventType(in expression); 
    Property=get_ Property(in expression); 
Props<String,String>.put(EventType, Property);} 
3. for(Map.Entry<String, String> entry:Props.entrySet()){ 
    Select * from Secunity_rule where user_role=login_user_role; 
for( Dataset.hasNext() ){ 
if (Dataset[i].eventProperty==entry.getKey()) 
if (NoLegality(Dataset[i].accessOperator,entry.getValue())==ture) 
        NProps[entry.getValue()];}} 
4. System.out.println(NProps[]); 
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IV. PRIVACY SECURITY PROTECTION ENGINE (PSPE) 
PSPE is independently created with CEP event pattern 
implementation space. Its content is determined by the 
privacy security access control rules defined by the senior 
system administrator and automatically updated depending 
on the adjustment of the rules. The basic mechanism of 
PSPE operation is copy, i.e. regard the event flow input into 
CEP engine as data bus and send the copy of the event in 
line with the privacy security protection rules on the data bus 
to the event pattern detection network inside the operation 
space. Beyond that, no operation will be made. This 
mechanism can effectively guarantee the event flow will 
flow through all privacy security protection engines and 
finally pass the event containing correctly authorized 
information to CEP processing nodes. 
The working principle inside PSPE is shown in Fig.3. It 
will convert the filtration operation of the event attribute to 
the tree structure with the event type as the root node, of 
which, EventType is the event type that can be processed in 
this space. The subnode under the root node of the event 
type is the event type included. The event attribute node will 
be included in the access operation defined in the privacy 
security protection rules (as one event attribute can only 
define one type of security access operation type, the event 
attribute node only contains one subnode). 
Here are some kinds of common detecting tree in PSPE. 
As shown in Fig.3 (a), suppose certain event type contains 
three event attributes and for certain user role, these three 
event attributes are all permitted to be accessed, thus the 
combined node will pass such event to the internal 
implementation space completely. It is contrary in Fig.3 (b) 
where the three attributes of the event are denied to be 
accessed, and such event will not be passed internally. Fig.3 
(c) shows the general situation under privacy security access 
control, i.e. user role is only allowed to access to some 
attribute content of one event while the private part is not 
permitted to be viewed. As Attr2 attribute is denied to be 
accessed, the node of such detecting tree will only combine 
Attr1 and Attr3 attributes and outputs a new event which 
only contains these two attributes. Fig.3 (d) displays the 
appearance of the detecting tree which conditionally reads 
the event attribute, of which, the condition verification 
includes single value comparison (as shown in Figure 2 (e), 
the comparison content: Attr1= value 1 && Attr3!= value 2) 
and multiple value comparison (as shown in Fig.3 (d), the 
comparison content: value 2<Attr2< value 1). The node will 
only allow the event whose comparison result is true to pass 
through. Fig.3 (f) shows the situation of event attribute 
statistics and calculation. The node will permit such event 
attribute content to be accessed and the function of node Ω is 
equivalent to ξ. As known from the above common detecting 
tree structure, PSPE is able to effectively prevent the 
unauthorized information from inflowing and using. By 
means of repackaging the event, the separation of the 
authorized and unauthorized information can be guaranteed.  
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Figure 3. Detection tree structure in privacy security protection engine 
V. PERFORMANCE TEST OF PRIVACY SECURITY ACCESS 
CONTROL FRAMEWORK 
The core part of CEP-SACF operation is PSPE, the 
operation performance of which is related to the input event 
flow rate and the total quantity of the internally registered 
detecting tree (record such parameter as ETs). The above 
content shows that the working efficiency of the detecting 
tree is related to the number of internal event attribute node 
(record such parameter as ATs) and the node type of the 
access operator (record such parameter as OPs). Therefore, 
this group of experiment will test the three parameters that 
influence the efficiency of the engine respectively. First of 
all, simulate the input event flow, each of which only 
contains one type of event. Each event is composed of one 
event type attribute field and several other attribute fields. 
The event flow generator will utilize multiple courses to 
produce event flow in parallel and send it out to simulate 
real scene. Then, the buffer queue of PSPE will receive these 
events and conduct security detection by the 
first-in-and-first-out sequence. The detecting tree indexes 
with the hash table and realizes it with the custom tree 
structure.  
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(a) Experiment 1 influence of detection tree number 
 
(b) Experiment 2 influence of event attribute number 
 
(c) Event attribute security access operator efficiency test 
Figure 4. Privacy security protection engine performance testing 
Experiment I registers three groups of Ets={10,20,30} 
with different quantity for contrast. It receives data at 
1,000-10,000 events/s and provides that the attribute 
quantity included in all events of such group of experiment 
is 2. The event attribute access operator is completely read 
operator ξ. As known from Fig.4 (a), as the input rate 
increases, the time taken by PSPE presents a linear growth 
trend, but the rise of total Ets has little influence on PSPE 
implementation efficiency because Hash Index has a high 
efficiency. The growth of total Ets has little influence on its 
index rate.  
Experiment II tests the three control groups in which the 
attribute quantity of the event is Ats={2,4,6}. The total 
detecting tree registered in such group of experiment is 
Ets=30 (thus, the actual total number of the attribute 
detecting tree in PSPE is 60, 120 and 180, respectively). 
Also, it receives data at 1,000-10,000 events/s and provides 
that the event attribute access operator of all attributes is 
completely read operator ξ. As known from Fig.4 (b), 
parameter Ats has a great influence on the implementation 
efficiency of PSPE. As the total Ats increases, the calculated 
amount of the traversal node inside PSPE will undergo a 
cumulative rise. The processing time taken by the three 
control groups basically keeps a multiple relationship. The 
total consuming time of PSPE is at millisecond level, which 
has little influence on the overall operation efficiency of 
CEP-SACF.  
Experiment III tests the performance of ξ, ф and ψ (as Ω 
and ξ is different in function, repeated test will not be done 
for Ω). This group of experiment provides Ets=30, Ats=2, 
Ops={ξ, ф, ψ}, with the data flow rate the same as above. 
The conditional expression of ф is [>,0]. That is to say, in 
spite of conditional judgment, all events are permitted to 
pass through. According to Fig.4 (c), as ψ denies events to 
pass through and there is no subsequent treatment. Thus, it 
consumes the shortest time (only including the time 
consumed in event type node searching and event attribute 
transversing). ф has calculation of conditional judgment on 
its node, so it consumes more time than the benchmark ξ 
operation. However, they come to the same conclusion that 
for different operators at different input rate, the total time 
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consumed in processing by PSPE can still keep at 
millisecond level, which represents high operation 
efficiency. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The experimental result shows that PSPE has a high 
implementation efficiency. At the same time, it is able to 
deal with different user roles in different ways, filtrate the 
event information not allowed to be accessed and generate 
new events in line with privacy security access control 
requirement. Thus, it has a feature of customizability. In 
addition, PSPE is completely integrated outside of CEP 
engine, which is very feasible because it has no influence on 
its original implementation structure and operation 
efficiency. It has certain application value by effectively 
making privacy security detection on the event information 
input/output CEP engine. 
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